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One view of Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) is that they are ‘most 
needed’ in slack labour markets, where more unemployed workers require help 
finding jobs. But ALMPs might be less effective in such labour markets because there 
are fewer vacancies with which programme participants can match. In this paper we 
use data over a nine year period, across 300 local labour markets, to show that the 
unemployment exit and job entry impacts of participating in a mandatory ALMP for 
unemployed young people – the British New Deal for Young People (NDYP) – were 
negatively correlated with unemployment rates. 
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 21.  Introduction 
 
Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) are used across the OECD in an effort 
to help the unemployed, or particular groups of unemployed, into jobs. These 
programmes usually involve one or more supply side measures such as job search 
assistance, training and work placements, together with benefits sanctions for non-
compliance. Some ALMPs also feature demand side measures such as wage subsidies 
for firms to hire programme participants. Evaluations are numerous and their findings 
diverse, although evidence is often found of positive impacts on unemployment exit, 
job entry, and/or future earnings (for reviews see Heckman et al., 1999; Martin, 2000; 
Blank, 2002; Kluve, 2006).  
 
Of particular interest in this literature is the question of whether similar ALMPs might 
have heterogeneous impacts according to the observed or unobserved characteristics 
of their participants and/or the particular nature of their provision in different areas or 
different times. A related but conceptually distinct question, yet to be widely 
addressed, is whether programme impacts vary systematically with labour market 
conditions. If this is the case then we have an additional explanation for some of the 
diversity of findings in evaluations of different programmes, at different times, and in 
different locations. And whether one views ALMPs as ‘most needed’ in slack labour 
markets (where more unemployed workers require help) or in tight labour markets 
(where more vacancies require filling), this question is also of critical importance for 
policy makers designing programmes for different labour market contexts. Given the 
recent rapid increase in unemployment rates experienced across much of the OECD, 
 3is what we learned about the impacts of ALMPs in more favourable labour market 
contexts still relevant?  
 
This paper uses data over a nine year period, across 300 local labour markets, to 
examine whether the unemployment exit and job entry impacts of participating in a 
mandatory ALMP for unemployed young people – the British New Deal for Young 
People (NDYP) – varied systematically with local unemployment rates. The NDYP 
has a number of useful characteristics for this purpose: it is delivered locally but 
eligibility and structure are set nationally; it is predominantly but not exclusively a 
supply side programme, with elements that are typical of ALMPs internationally; 
participation in the programme is mandatory for the target group; it has already been 
widely evaluated with all studies indicating significant programme participation 
impacts on unemployment exit and/or job entry (e.g. see Blundell et al., 2004); and 
because the programme ran nationally for a long period of time, our data feature 
substantial variation in unemployment rates across both space and time.  
 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple framework for 
why we might expect differential ALMP impacts across labour markets. Section 3 
discusses a handful of existing empirical studies that have examined this issue. 
Section 4 presents more detail on the NDYP, its institutional context and its existing 
evaluations. Section 5 summarises our data. Section 6 discusses identification and 
presents some initial indications of programme impacts and whether they vary across 
labour markets. Section 7 presents econometric estimates of programme impacts on 
unemployment exit and job entry and their variation with unemployment rates. 
Section 8 introduces controls for heterogeneous impacts by observed participant 
 4characteristics and local differences in the precise nature of programme provision. 
Section 9 concludes.   
 
2.  A Simple Framework 
 
Consider an exemplar ALMP, predominantly supply side in nature, covering either a 
range of local labour markets at a particular point in time, the same labour market 
over a period of time, or both. The ALMP is governed by uniform eligibility rules and 
contains a uniform set of measures, although there may be local or temporal variation 
in how the programme is implemented in terms of the duration or weighting given to 
each measure. Participation in the ALMP is mandatory for those in its target group. 
Our interest is in how participation in such an ALMP affects the probabilities of 
unemployment exit and job entry for its participants. (We do not have data on 
subsequent earnings.) But rather than focus on the average treatment effect for the 
treated, we explore how treatment effects might vary in different labour market 
contexts.
1  
 
Three potential sources of variation exist. First, ALMPs might have greater impacts in 
tight labour markets because more or better vacancies exist (e.g. Bloom et al., 2001). 
(Taken to extremes, there is little point intervening to, say, increase search intensity, if 
there are no job vacancies offering above the reservation wage in the local area.) On 
the other hand the added value of ALMPs may be lower in tight labour markets 
because many of the unemployed would have found jobs in any case (e.g. Gueron and 
Pauly, 1991). If neither mechanism dominates at all unemployment rates then the 
                                                 
1 To keep the discussion simple we assume no firm or worker migration between labour markets, 
although this is not critical.  
 5overall relationship between unemployment rates and programme impacts may be 
non-monotonic.  
 
Second, ALMPs may have heterogeneous impacts on their participants according to 
observed or unobserved participant characteristics (e.g. Heckman et al., 1999). Such 
characteristics might be uncorrelated with labour market conditions, but it is more 
likely that the composition of the unemployed differs when unemployment rates are 
high compared to when they are low. Kluve (2006), for example, suggests that 
unemployed workers will have less favourable characteristics – they will be less 
employable for a given vacancy – in tight labour markets. Friedlander (1988) suggests 
that from a policy maker’s perspective it may be difficult to help those with the least 
employable characteristics, but also that it might be difficult to help those with the 
most favourable characteristics since they will gain little from programme 
participation. This provides another mechanism for a potentially non-monotonic 
relationship between unemployment rates and programme impacts.  
 
Third, the policy ‘treatment’ – the precise nature of the measures received – may vary 
across individuals, in different areas, or at different times (e.g. Blank, 2002), and this 
variation may itself be correlated with labour market tightness (e.g. Dorsett, 2006). 
This may be because the particular bundle of measures each individual participant 
receives is correlated with his or her characteristics, which are themselves correlated 
with labour market tightness. Alternatively, programme providers in tight labour 
markets might focus more on, say, job search measures, whereas those in slack labour 
markets might focus more on, say, training measures, or vice versa. Again there is no 
reason to assume any such variation is monotonically related to unemployment rates.   
 6 
Taken together we are left with the possibility of programme participation impacts 
that vary with labour market conditions with uncertain sign and monotonicity, and 
although such differences in impacts may be small, or may cancel out, it would seem 
more appropriate when evaluating programmes across different labour markets to start 
by ruling them in rather than ruling them out.  
 
3.  Existing Literature 
 
Few papers report empirical evidence on this particular issue, although measures of 
prevailing labour market conditions – usually unemployment rates – are commonly 
controlled for, independent of programme impacts, in ALMP or welfare to work 
programme evaluations. Blank (2002) suggests that a relationship between 
programme impacts and unemployment rates might help explain why some studies 
find larger impacts than others, but cites no formal evidence of such a relationship. 
Bloom et al. (2001), Kluve (2006) and Lechner and Wunsch (2009), however, do 
explicitly test for such a relationship, although each study is rather different and they 
draw different conclusions. In a related study, Jurajda and Tannery (2003) explores 
differential impacts of extended unemployment insurance entitlement across labour 
markets.   
 
Bloom et al. (2001) reviews random assignment based evaluations of three welfare to 
work programmes operating in 59 sites across the US: California’s Greater Avenues 
for Independence Program, Florida’s Project Independence, and the National 
Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies. They find bigger impacts on the future 
 7earnings of participants in areas of low unemployment relative to areas of high 
unemployment, with a one percentage point increase in the county level 
unemployment rate reducing the programme impact on future earnings by an average 
of $94 per year. The precise nature of the programmes provided is also shown to be an 
important determinant of impact, with better outcomes for ALMPs with more 
immediate job search focus. Participant characteristics, e.g. education level, past 
employment and earnings experience and past welfare receipt, do not appear to 
influence programme impacts in a systematic way. Note, however, that the study only 
looks for linear relationships between programme impacts and these various factors.  
 
Kluve (2006) presents a cross-country meta-analysis of national level European 
ALMPs drawing on the findings of 137 existing evaluation studies. The main 
dimension along which programme impacts on employment probability vary in these 
studies is the type of ALMP, with wage subsidies and job search services and 
sanctions being the most effective. But Kluve also examines how programme impacts 
relate to national unemployment rates, finding a positive relationship between 
programme impact and unemployment rate which disappears when country dummies 
are included. As for Bloom et al. (2001) this study looks only for linear relationships 
between impacts and unemployment. Further, because Kluve draws on macro level 
studies there is no explicit consideration of how local implementation differences of a 
given programme, or differences in the characteristics of participants, affect 
programme impacts. To the extent that these are correlated with national 
unemployment rates, the positive/zero relationship found between unemployment and 
programme impact could be capturing a combination of some or all of the 
mechanisms discussed in Section 2.  
 8 
Lechner and Wunsch (2009) study differences in German ALMP impacts, on 
subsequent earnings and unemployment and employment probabilities, using micro 
data over ten years with unemployment rates specified at the national level. Again in a 
linear framework they find larger programme impacts when unemployment is higher, 
whether they control for programme type and/or participant characteristics or not. 
They also explore differences across regions, again finding a positive relationship 
between ALMP impacts and regional unemployment rates, albeit of smaller 
magnitude and only marginal statistical significance. 
 
Jurajda and Tannery (2003) examine whether extending the duration of 
unemployment insurance entitlement has differential adverse impacts on job entry and 
recall hazards in labour markets characterised by different unemployment rates – 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh – in the early 1980s. In this case the ‘treatment’ – the 
extension of benefit entitlement duration – is the same in both markets, so any 
variation in impacts is explained by differences in labour market tightness and/or in 
the characteristics of the unemployed. Also adopting a linear specification, they find a 
statistically significant negative relationship between unemployment rates and the 
adverse ‘extension’ effect which becomes insignificant when they control for 
heterogeneity across individuals.    
 
That these studies draw different conclusions is perhaps not surprising given that they 
differ in terms of programmes covered, level of aggregation, outcome measures, and 
degree of control for heterogeneous programme impacts across participant 
characteristics and/or by programme provision. One factor that is common to all four 
 9studies, however, is that they specify linear relationships between unemployment rates 
and programme impacts. In contrast, we have suggested that such relationships could 
be non-linear. This also ties in with evidence of non-monotonic heterogeneous 
treatment effects by observed participant characteristics. For example, Friedlander 
(1988) studied variation in programme impacts across observed characteristics for a 
number of early 1980s US welfare-to-work programme, finding programme impacts 
for those with characteristics that place them in the middle of the ‘employability 
distribution’ were higher than for those at either end of the distribution. More recently 
Aakvik et al. (2005) found non-linear variation in treatment effects of a Norwegian 
ALMP across quintiles of the distributions of observed characteristics including age 
and education level. Having said that, unemployment rate distributions in the Bloom 
et al. (2001), Jurajda and Tannery (2003), Kluve (2006), and Lechner and Wunsch 
(2009) studies are sufficiently similar to suggest that the assumption of linear 
relationships between unemployment rates and programme impacts is unlikely to be 
the main driver of their contrasting conclusions.    
 
4.  The New Deal for Young People 
 
Unemployment benefit, which takes either an insurance-based or a social assistance 
form, goes by the name of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in Britain. Insurance-based 
JSA is paid at a national rate independent of prior earnings, lasts up to six months in 
any particular spell and requires a work history for eligibility. Income-based JSA 
(social assistance for the unemployed), paid to those not eligible for insurance-based 
JSA either because of insufficient work history or because they have exhausted their 
current entitlement, is also paid at a national rate but is means tested. Both types of 
 10JSA are covered by the same conditionality in terms of demonstrating availability for 
work and providing evidence of job search activity, which is enforced via fortnightly, 
face-to-face signing interviews in the local benefit office (now called Jobcentre Plus 
offices).   
 
Following the introduction of NDYP on 6
th April 1998, a young person aged between 
18 and 24 years that had been unemployed and claiming either form of JSA for six 
months had to report for a job search interview with a personal advisor or face benefit 
sanctions. Further meetings with the personal adviser, offering individually tailored 
job search assistance, followed. This was known as Gateway and was intended to last 
up to four months, but in some areas often lasted longer (see Dorsett, 2006). If at the 
end of that time the young person was still unemployed, a compulsory Option had to 
be taken up.
2  There were four Options: (i) full time education or government 
supported training courses, (ii) work placements in the voluntary sector or (iii) on the 
Environmental Taskforce (essentially low level public sector work experience), and 
(iv) subsidised jobs in the local labour market. Young people on an option were 
counted as having left registered unemployment although, with the exception of those 
in subsidised jobs, they still received benefits with a small supplement and were 
encouraged to continue job searching. If, after completing an Option, a young person 
was still without a job, they entered a Follow-through stage, went back on the 
unemployment register, and received further one-on-one job search assistance. If the 
young person was still unemployed after three months on Follow-through the clock 
started again from zero and a further six months of unemployment led to a second 
NDYP ‘episode’ with re-entry into Gateway. Figure 1 summarises. The programme 
                                                 
2 To May 2009 there had been just over 2 million entrants to NDYP, one third of whom reached the 
Option stage of the programme.   
 11ran uninterrupted across Britain until being replaced by Flexible New Deal in 2009 
(see Department for Work and Pensions, 2007). 
 
Fig 1: NDYP Timeline 
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usually up to 
three months 
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  Subsidized 
employment 
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training 
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  Environmental 
Taskforce 
Gateway – 
usually up 
to four 
months 
Unemployed  
- usually for 
six months 
 
NDYP has been the subject of numerous evaluations (e.g. Riley and Young, 2001; 
Wilkinson, 2003; White, 2004; Blundell et al. 2004; De Giorgi, 2005; Beale et al. 
2008; McVicar and Podivinsky, 2009). Most have taken a partial equilibrium 
approach using the age restrictions of the policy to identify programme impacts. The 
benchmark study is Blundell et al. (2004) who also exploit the split between ten 
Pathfinder Areas which introduced NDYP in January 1998 and the rest of Britain 
which introduced NDYP in April 1998 to provide an alternative identification strategy 
for the programme’s early stages. They present difference-in-differences (DID) 
estimates of the impact of NDYP participation on the probability of being 
unemployed or being employed by the end of the tenth month of unemployment, 
conditional on having been unemployed for six months, for young men.
3 They find 
evidence of large, statistically significant and reasonably robust NDYP participation 
                                                 
3 Their main focus is on men because of differential trends for the two female age groups prior to the 
introduction of NDYP, although they do report estimates for women. 
 12effects, e.g. a 20-40% increase in the probability of participants being employed ten 
months after the start of an unemployment spell. Some of this – they suggest around 
half – is accounted for by take up of NDYP Options. They find no evidence of ‘threat’ 
effects on those about to enter NDYP (see Black et al., 2003). Other evaluation 
studies have presented estimates broadly in line with Blundell et al. (2004).  
 
White (2004), Dorsett (2006) and McVicar and Podivinsky (2009) all consider the 
possibility of heterogeneous NDYP effects across space, but with different foci. White 
(2004) finds heterogeneous NDYP impacts on unemployment exit rates according to 
the nature of the implementation of the programme in different areas, with greater 
‘work focus’ leading to more positive impacts like Bloom et al. (2001). Dorsett (2006) 
compares outcomes for participants taking different routes through NDYP and finds 
higher rates of job entry for participants that stay longer on Gateway than for those 
entering options, with the exception of the subsidized employment option. He also 
finds that Gateway is more likely to be extended beyond four months in tighter labour 
markets. McVicar and Podivinsky (2009) find that the impacts of NDYP participation 
on hazard rates for a variety of exits from unemployment differ across twelve UK 
regions. For some exit destinations these differences appear weakly correlated with 
regional unemployment rates and/or average claimant characteristics at the regional 
level, but the study draws no firm conclusions in this respect. Other studies that 
consider such differences stop short of providing estimates of NDYP impacts against 
a defined counterfactual (e.g. Turok and Webster, 1998; Sunley et al., 2005).  
 
 
 
 135. The Data 
 
In common with many existing evaluations of NDYP (e.g. Blundell et al., 2004) we 
use JUVOS data here
4. JUVOS tracks all (claimant) unemployment spells and exit 
destinations for a five percent sample of the British working age population from 
1996 onwards.
5 We restrict our attention to spells starting between 1
st October 1996 
and 31
st December 2005 – with all spells ongoing as of 31
st December 2005 treated as 
right-censored – and only for males aged 18-29 years at start of spell. This gives us 
information on 384,646 spells across 135,736 individuals, over a nine year period 
spanning the introduction of NDYP, for the eligible age group (18-24 year olds) and 
their closest comparators (25-29 year olds). This sample is larger and spans a longer 
time period than any of the previously published NDYP evaluations. As well as 
information on exit destination, the data include information on start date and end date 
of spell, age, occupation sought (interpreted as a proxy for education level, as in 
Dorsett (2006)), marital status, and – crucially – on the location of the benefit office at 
which the claimant is registered and their home postcode district.
6 This information 
allows us to assign individuals to Units of Delivery (UoDs) (the administrative units 
delivering NDYP) and to Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) (geographical areas which 
                                                 
4Office for National Statistics, JUVOS Cohort: Longitudinal Database of the Claimant Unemployed 
since 1982, 12th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive, September 2005. SN: 3721.    
5 Information is actually available on spells from 1982 but exit destinations are only added from 1996. 
The recording of exit destinations in the administrative data from which the JUVOS sample are drawn 
is not perfect, with many spells ending due to a failure to sign on by the claimant, in other words an 
‘unknown destination’. Around a third of all spells in our data end for this reason and it has been 
suggested that around half of these are in fact exits to employment (National Audit Office, 2002). We 
test robustness to grouping these exits together with exits to employment or treating them as separate 
destinations.  
6 At the time of the introduction of NDYP there were close to 1,000 benefit offices across Britain and 
3,000 Postcode Districts (the first three or four digits of a UK postcode).  
 14approximate to local labour markets).
7 All these covariates are treated as time 
invariant within spells. Table 1 presents sample means and counts of spells for the full 
sample and for the two age groups pre and post NDYP.  
 
Although the JUVOS data do not include information on whether individual claimants 
are participating in NDYP or not, given the mandatory nature of the programme we 
can  assume that all JSA claimants in the relevant age group become NDYP 
participants on day one of their seventh month of unemployment. A similar approach 
is taken by Wilkinson (2003) and McVicar and Podivinsky (2009). In what follows 
participation in NDYP is therefore captured by a time varying binary dummy equal to 
one for those aged 18-24 years for that part of any unemployment spell beyond six 
months of duration and since 6
th April 1998, and zero otherwise.
8 By examining 
outcomes at various different points after the beginning of the spell, or by right 
censoring unemployment spells at different durations, this dummy can be used to 
emphasise Gateway effects and Option entry to varying degrees, although they cannot 
be fully separated because some participants take up Options before completing four 
months of Gateway and Option take-up is treated as an exit from the current 
unemployment spell.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 TTWAs are defined as geographical areas in which 75% or more of the resident employed population 
work, and are generally centered on larger towns or cities. Britain is divided into around 300 TTWAs 
areas and 144 UoDs.  
8 Our results are robust to inclusion or omission of Pathfinder areas that introduced NDYP three 
months earlier.  
 15Table 1: Sample Means (Standard Deviations) and Other Descriptive Statistics 
  All Spells  Pre NDYP 
Spells 18-
24s 
Pre NDYP 
Spells, 25-
29s 
Post 
NDYP 
Spells, 18-
24s 
Post 
NDYP 
Spells, 25-
29s 
Unemployment rate at start of 
spell, % (st. deviation) 
3.44 
(1.38) 
4.68 
(1.50) 
4.70 
(1.50) 
3.15 
(1.15) 
3.13 
(1.17) 
Married/cohabit  
 
.108 .115 .272 .053 .164 
Age, years 
 
23.2 21.1 27.1 21.0 27.1 
Managerial job sought 
 
.024 .025 .039 .017 .033 
Professional job sought  
 
.027 .023 .046 .018 .039 
Associate professional job 
sought  
.059 .054 .071 .052 .071 
Administrative job sought  
  
.111 .173 .125 .107 .087 
Skilled trades job sought  
 
.129 .147 .187 .114 .134 
Personal service job sought 
 
.044 .081 .067 .038 .034 
Sales job sought  
 
.088 .100 .058 .103 .062 
Process/ operative job sought 
  
.091 .099 .136 .072 .111 
Past unemployment duration, 
days 
251 
 
33.4 
 
33.1 
 
251 
 
404 
 
No. complete spells > six 
months 
77833 3962  2713 35861 24155 
No. complete spells 
 
384646 37517  23187 203081 105932 
Duration of complete spells,   
days 
111.4 
 
75.0 77.4 92.5 125.4 
Not unemployed after ten 
months, given unemployed after 
six months, % of spells 
.602 
 
.759 .747 .672 .462 
Employed after ten months, 
given unemployed after six 
months, % of spells 
.257 .390 .378 .266 .207 
Notes: Pre-NDYP (post-NDYP) spells omit those ongoing as of 6/4/1998 (31/12/2005) for the purposes 
of counting number of complete spells, number of spells>six months and duration of complete spells. 
All other descriptive statistics are expressed as a proportion of spells (rather than as a proportion of 
individuals) and are based on observed covariates measured at start of spell (including right censored 
spells). Age groups are defined by age measured six months after start of spell.  
 
 
There are two exceptions to the six months entry rule. First, some groups facing 
particular barriers to employment, with the largest being unemployed single parents, 
can choose to enter NDYP early (i.e. before being unemployed for six months). But 
 16by omitting females we minimise this problem.
9 Second, those re-entering 
unemployment directly from a NDYP option, or after a spell off JSA not long enough 
to ‘set the clock back to zero’, either enter the Follow Through stage of NDYP or go 
straight back into the Gateway stage without the six months wait. We treat all new 
spells of unemployment for 18-24 year olds that start within six months of a previous 
NDYP episode ending as being covered by these provisions, and we label them as 
Follow Through spells.
10  
 
Our measure of the state of the labour market is the local adult (claimant) 
unemployment rate, available monthly at the TTWA level, which we treat as 
exogenous. To keep the data manageable we use the unemployment rate at the start of 
the spell and treat it as time invariant within spells, although we test robustness to 
using the unemployment rate six months into spells instead. There is considerable 
variation in TTWA unemployment rates across space, e.g. ranging from 1% in 
Newbury to 8.3% in Hartlepool in April 1998. Although they tend to move quite 
slowly month on month, because of our nine year data coverage there is also 
substantial variation across time, with the (unweighted) average of these TTWA 
unemployment rates falling from 4.8% in October 1996 to 2.1% in December 2005. 
 
6.  Identification and Preliminary Estimates 
 
First consider the identification of the NDYP participation treatment effect not 
differentiated by local unemployment rates. Because NDYP was not introduced 
                                                 
9 We also make this restriction because Blundell et al. (2004) find that 18-24 year old and 25-29 year 
old females were following divergent trends prior to the introduction of NDYP. 
10 As a test of robustness we also re-estimate with all spells for an individual following a first spell in 
NDYP dropped from the sample.  
 17experimentally there is no readymade control group to help us evaluate its effects on 
participants. Most NDYP evaluations have dealt with this problem by using the age-
based eligibility rules of NDYP to define a treatment group (18-24 year olds with 
unemployment spells of at least six months duration) and a comparison group (25-29 
year olds, 25-30 year olds or 30-39 year olds, with unemployment spells of at least six 
months duration) and using some variant of DID to estimate treatment effects on the 
treated. We adopt a similar approach here in a duration analysis framework.  
 
The validity of the age-based approach is discussed elsewhere (e.g. Blundell et al., 
2004), but briefly it requires that the two age groups had been following similar trends 
prior to the introduction of the NDYP, and that NDYP does not lead to significant 
inter age group substitution effects. Blundell et al. (2004) show both assumptions to 
be supported by the JUVOS data for males. Ideally our treatment and comparison 
groups would also be similar in all other respects. But unemployed 18-24 year olds 
and unemployed 25-29 year olds are unavoidably different, in age but also in 
characteristics associated with age such as marital status and accumulated 
unemployment experience. Further, our duration analysis approach means that 
unemployment spells shorter than six months for 18-24 year olds can also contribute 
to the comparison group. For these reasons, together with the mandatory nature of 
NDYP participation for the target group and our desire to keep things simple so as to 
focus on differences across labour markets, we stop short of using matching methods 
on our sample. We do, however, control for the observable characteristics in the 
JUVOS data along with dummies for UoDs, time quadratics specific to each age 
group and, in one robustness test, random intercepts for individual time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 18 
The JUVOS data allow us to examine NDYP impacts on a number of outcomes of 
interest. Because we know the duration of all (uncensored) unemployment spells in 
our sample to the nearest day we can estimate the impact of NDYP participation on 
the daily hazard rate for exiting unemployment using a duration analysis approach. 
We can also exploit the exit destination data in JUVOS to estimate the NDYP impact 
on the job entry hazard, which as for Blundell et al. (2004) includes entry to ‘NDYP 
Option’ jobs. Other studies of ALMP impacts to adopt such a duration analysis 
approach include Jensen et al. (2003) and McVicar and Podivinsky (2009). We also 
follow Blundell et al. (2004) by estimating probits for the NDYP impacts on the 
probability of no longer being unemployed and the probability of being employed ten 
months after starting an unemployment spell, conditional upon having been 
unemployed for six months, to test robustness.
11  
 
Because NDYP is a mandatory programme for 18-24 year olds unemployed for six 
months the standard selection problem associated with individuals choosing (or being 
chosen) to participate in the ALMP is much diminished (for a discussion of selection 
issues in this context see Heckman et al., 1999). But to ignore selection issues 
altogether assumes that NDYP has no impact on outcomes at less than six months 
duration. But claimants in the eligible age group may cease to claim in the month 
prior to NDYP entry in order to avoid the programme, e.g. because they receive a 
letter summoning them to participate or simply because they know such a letter is 
imminent (see Blundell et al., 2004). The evidence on the existence and sign of such 
effects in the case of NDYP is mixed, with different studies finding zero or small 
                                                 
11 Like Blundell et al. (2004) we assume those that exited unemployment to employment and have not 
re-entered unemployment at the point of measurement are still employed.  
 19effects of either sign prior to six months duration (see Riley and Young, 2001; 
Wilkinson, 2003; Blundell et al., 2004; De Giorgi, 2005; McVicar and Podivinsky, 
2009). Here, because hazard rates beyond a certain month are in any case conditioned 
on reaching that month, we simply test robustness to defining the NDYP treatment as 
starting after five months rather than six months. For the probits we follow Blundell et 
al. (2004) and condition explicitly on reaching the seventh month of unemployment. 
 
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Hazard Functions by Age Group, Pre & Post NDYP 
(a) Unemployment Exit 
Before Introduction of NDYP 
 
(b) Job Entry 
  
 
Kaplan-Meier (KM) hazard functions for 18-24 year olds and 25-29 year olds before 
and after NDYP, for unemployment exit and for job entry, are shown in Figure 2. 
They give a clear visual representation of the impact of NDYP on the younger age 
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 20group: from very similar shaped KM hazards prior to NDYP we move to very 
different KM hazards after NDYP, with the divergence beginning at just under 200 
days, i.e. at the time of entry to NDYP.  
 
Table 1 (towards the bottom) reports mean unemployment spell duration for each age 
group before and after the introduction of NDYP. For 18-24 year olds we expect 
unemployment durations to be shorter, on average, for spells starting after the 
introduction of NDYP than for spells starting before the introduction of NDYP. This 
is obscured in the table, however, because the mean durations treat spells starting 
before NDYP as right censored at the date of its introduction and because the sample 
period before the introduction of NDYP is considerably shorter than the period 
following the introduction of NDYP. But the difference in average uncensored spell 
duration between the before and after periods is much greater for the 25-29 year old 
age group than for the 18-24 year olds age group, with a simple unconditional DID 
estimate suggesting spell duration for 18-24s following the introduction of NDYP is 
30.5 days shorter than it would otherwise have been. Similar DID estimates of the 
impact of NDYP participation on the probability of not being unemployed (being 
employed) after ten months, conditional on being unemployed after six months, 
suggest a 20 (five) percentage point increase.  
 
Now consider identification of heterogeneous NDYP participation impacts across 
labour markets. We explore this by including an interaction term between NDYP 
participation and the local unemployment rate in the various specifications of the 
empirical model. Jurajda and Tannery (2003) adopt a similar strategy. To allow this 
relationship to be non-monotonic we also interact the NDYP participation dummy 
 21with the square of the local unemployment rate, and we test sensitivity to adding 
further powers.   
 
Can we pick up systematic variation of NDYP impacts with local unemployment rates 
in the raw data? Figures 3 and 4 present KM hazards for the two age groups, before 
and after the introduction of NDYP, for exits from unemployment and for job entry, 
but now separately by TTWA unemployment rate quartiles. All show similar patterns 
to those in Figure 2, but the gaps between the post-NDYP hazards for job entry 
(Figure 4) are larger for middle unemployment quartiles than for the highest and 
lowest unemployment quartiles. This is suggestive of an inverse-U shaped 
relationship between NDYP treatment effect and local unemployment rate.  There is a 
similar suggestion in the KM hazards for exit from unemployment, although it’s not 
so clear (see Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Hazard Functions by Age Group & TTWA 
Unemployment Rate Quartile, Pre & Post NDYP, Unemployment Exit 
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 23Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier Hazard Functions by Age Group & TTWA 
Unemployment Rate Quartile, Pre & Post NDYP, Job Entry 
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The final step in the identification process is to control as far as possible for other 
dimensions along which NDYP treatment effects might systematically vary. First 
consider differences in provision across the UoDs. We know from White (2004) that 
work-focused UoDs increase the subsequent chances of unemployment exit relative to 
‘free option choice’ UoDs, and from Dorsett (2006) that this UoD focus itself partly 
reflects the state of the local labour market. So differences in provision may confound 
the NDYP-unemployment rate interaction coefficients if not controlled for. In Section 
8 we therefore also interact the NDYP participation dummy with dummies for the 144 
UoDs. Second consider the possibility of heterogeneous NDYP impacts across 
individuals with different characteristics. To the extent that such characteristics are 
correlated with local unemployment rates they may also confound the estimated 
NDYP*unemployment interactive effects if not accounted for. We therefore include 
interactives of the NDYP participation dummy with all the observed characteristics 
covariates, making a reasonable conjecture about the likely magnitude of 
heterogeneous NDYP impacts across unobserved participant characteristics.   
 
7.  Variation in NDYP Impacts by Unemployment Rate 
 
In common with much of the empirical unemployment duration literature, we take a 
reduced form Cox Proportional Hazards (CPH) approach to estimation (see van den 
Berg, 2001) as given below: 
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34
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In (1), h(t) is the hazard rate, h0(t) is the baseline hazard, NDYP is a binary dummy for 
NDYP participation, FOLLOW is a binary dummy for participation in Follow 
Through,  U denotes the local unemployment rate, x1…xN are observed individual 
characteristics and UoD1 to UoD144 are the UoD dummies. Note that we do not 
control for differences in NDYP impacts by observed characteristics or by local 
differences in provision. For tractability, and in common with most applications of 
duration analysis where more than one type of ‘failure’ (exit destination) is possible, 
we assume independent competing risks when estimating the hazard for job entry (in 
practice, spells with any other exit destination are treated as right censored). The daily 
data are treated as continuous and all spells are treated as right censored after twelve 
months.  
 
We adopt the CPH model because it allows for flexibility in the shape of the baseline 
hazard (again see van den Berg, 2001). The cost to this flexibility is that, unlike in a 
parametric mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model, we cannot explicitly control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level with such a large data set (see Han 
and Hausman, 1990), although we do test sensitivity to this by also estimating (1) as 
an MPH model combining a Weibull baseline with gamma-distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
The CPH estimates for the unemployment exit hazard function are presented in Table 
2. Estimates from five variants of the model are presented, although we leave 
discussion of models 4 and 5 for Section 8. Results are presented in coefficient form, 
 26i.e. (some of) the βs and δs from the above equation, and are interpretable as semi-
elasticities.   
 
First consider Model 1. The estimates suggest that participation in NDYP increases 
the unemployment exit hazard rate by 50%, i.e. a large, positive and highly 
statistically significant NDYP treatment effect. Note that this combines Gateway 
effects on ‘non-Option’ exits together with Option entry effects given we have only 
right censored spells after twelve months. Participation in Follow Through also has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the hazard, but of smaller magnitude. 
The local unemployment rate is negatively and significantly correlated with the 
hazard rate and all observed individual characteristics covariates are statistically 
significant with the anticipated signs. Including UoD dummies and time quadratics 
specific to the 18-24 age group and the 25-29 age group (Model 2) makes little 
difference to these estimates, although the magnitude of the NDYP and Follow 
Through coefficients falls slightly.  
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Table 2: Cox PH Estimates, Unemployment Exit, Coefficients (St. Errors)  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Model 4  Model 5 
NDYP  
 
.503*** 
(.009) 
.446*** 
(.009) 
.213*** 
(.038) 
.300*** 
(.039) 
.747*** 
(.063) 
NDYP* 
Unemp. rate 
   .151*** 
(.020) 
.153*** 
(.020) 
-.003 
(.025) 
NDYP* Unemp. rate^2      -.021*** 
(.003) 
-.022*** 
(.003) 
-.011*** 
(.003) 
NDYP*age       .016*** 
(.003) 
.020*** 
(.003) 
NDYP*cohabit       -.085*** 
(.017) 
-.080*** 
(.017) 
NDYP*managerial       -.274*** 
(.050) 
-.265*** 
(.050) 
NDYP*professional       -.336*** 
(.049) 
-337*** 
(.049) 
NDYP*associate prof        -.137*** 
(.026) 
-.135*** 
(.026) 
NDYP*admin       -.176*** 
(.019) 
-.153*** 
(.019) 
NDYP*skilled trade        -.133*** 
(.018) 
-.120*** 
(.019) 
NDYP*personal service        -.170*** 
(.029) 
-.135*** 
(.029) 
NDYP*sales       -.044** 
(.020) 
-.052*** 
(.020) 
NDYP*process ops.        -.051** 
(.022) 
-.038* 
(.022) 
NDYP*past unemp. 
duration 
    -.0002*** 
(.00002) 
-.0002*** 
(.00002) 
NDYP*UoD dummies 
 
No No No No  Yes*** 
Follow Through 
 
.108*** 
(.010) 
.100*** 
(.010) 
.100*** 
(.010) 
.095*** 
(.010) 
.096*** 
(.010) 
Unemployment rate  -.092*** 
(.002) 
-.058*** 
(.003) 
-.057*** 
(.003) 
-.057*** 
(.003) 
-.052*** 
(.003) 
Characteristics controls 
 
Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***  Yes*** 
UoD dummies 
 
No Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
Age-group specific time 
quadratics 
No Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
No. Spells  384646  384646  384646  384646  384646 
No. Failures  353826  353826  353826  353826  353826 
No. Individuals  135736  135736  135736  135736  135736 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -4249445  -4244890  -4244858  -4244727  -4244453 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. NDYP is a 
binary dummy for NDYP participation which equals 1 for participants during those parts of 
unemployment spells covered by NDYP and 0 otherwise. Follow Through is a binary dummy for 
participation in the Follow Through stage of NDYP, equal to 1 for the first three months of any 
unemployment spell starting within 6 months of a previous spell in Gateway, for the relevant age 
group. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  
 
 
 
 28Our primary interest is not in the impact of NDYP participation per se, however, but 
in whether/how it varies with local unemployment rates. Model 3 adds the quadratic 
NDYP*unemployment terms to Model 2.
12 The coefficient on the interactive term in 
the level of unemployment is positive and highly statistically significant, and the 
coefficient on the interactive term in the square of unemployment is negative and 
highly statistically significant. In other words Model 3 suggests an inverse-U shaped 
relationship between the impact of NDYP participation on the unemployment exit 
hazard rate and the unemployment rate. The magnitude of this non-linear interactive 
effect is large: combining the coefficients from the standalone and interactive NDYP 
dummies suggests participation in NDYP increases the hazard by 48% at the mean 
unemployment rate but only by 44% at plus or minus one standard deviation. Figure 5 
plots the estimated participation effect on the hazard across unemployment rates 
ranging from two standard deviations below to two standard deviations above the 
mean, and also shows robustness to inclusion of higher order interactive terms up to 
an order five polynomial.  
 
To further test the sensitivity of this basic result the first two columns of Table 3 
present estimates of the key parameters for a number of model/sample variations: 
replacing the unemployment rate at start of spell with unemployment rate six months 
after the start of spell; excluding those with a previous NDYP episode; excluding 
Pathfinder areas; specifying the NDYP treatment as starting after five months rather 
than after six months; right-censoring unemployment spells at ten, nine and eight 
months rather than at twelve months; comparing only 24 and 25 year olds to focus on 
differences closer to the age-based discontinuity in programme eligibility; estimating 
                                                 
12 The coefficient of the standalone NDYP dummy can now be interpreted as the impact of NDYP in a 
labour market with a zero unemployment rate. 
 29a MPH model with Weibull baseline and gamma unobserved heterogeneity in place of 
the CPH model; and finally, the marginal effects from a probit model of the 
probability of being not unemployed ten months after the start of an unemployment 
spell conditional on still being unemployed after six months. Although precise 
magnitudes vary, all but one of these variants suggest a similar inverse-U shaped 
relationship between the impact of NDYP participation on the hazard for 
unemployment exit and the unemployment rate.  
 
 
Figure 5: Sensitivity of NDYP Impact on the Hazard Rate for Unemployment 
Exit by TTWA Unemployment Rate, NDYP Interacting with Different Order 
Unemployment Rate Polynomials, Model 3 
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Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis, Unemployment Exit, Models 3 & 5 
Model 3  Model 5   
NDYP* 
Unemp. rate 
NDYP* Unemp. 
rate^2 
NDYP* 
Unemp. rate 
NDYP* Unemp. 
rate^2 
CPH, as reported in Table 3  .151*** 
(.020) 
-.021*** 
(.003) 
-.003 
(.025) 
-.011*** 
(.003) 
CPH, NDYP interacted with 
unemployment rate at 6 
months 
.163*** 
(.021) 
-.023*** 
(.003) 
-.011 
(.027) 
-.011*** 
(.003) 
CPH, excluding those with a 
previous NDYP episode 
.114*** 
(.021) 
-.017*** 
(.003) 
-.021 
(.027) 
-.006* 
(.003) 
CPH, excluding Pathfinder 
Areas 
.153*** 
(.021) 
-.020*** 
(.003) 
.016 
(.027) 
-.010*** 
(.003) 
CPH, NDYP = 1 after 5 
months 
.102*** 
(.017) 
-.015*** 
(.002) 
-.032 
(.021) 
-.005* 
(.003) 
CPH, spells right censored 
at 10 months 
.126*** 
(.024) 
-.020*** 
(.003) 
-.025 
(.031) 
-.009** 
(.004) 
CPH, spells right censored 
at 9 months 
.118*** 
(.027) 
-.020*** 
(.004) 
-.029 
(.034) 
-.010** 
(.004) 
CPH, spells right censored 
at 8 months 
.124*** 
(.032) 
-.023*** 
(.004) 
-.059 
(.042) 
-.010* 
(.005) 
CPH, 24 year olds vs. 25 
year olds only 
.199** 
(.082) 
-.028*** 
(.011) 
.090 
(.110) 
-.026* 
(.014) 
MPH model, Weibull 
baseline, gamma-distributed 
unobserved heterogeneity 
-.010 
(.007) 
-.009*** 
(.001) 
.025 
(.030) 
-.032*** 
(.004) 
NDYP* Unemp. Rate 
polynomials order 1-5 
See Figure 5  See Figure 5 
Probit marginal effects for 
probability of not being 
unemployed after 10 
months, conditional on 
being unemployed after 6 
months 
.026*** 
(.003) 
-.005*** 
(.0004) 
.007** 
(.003) 
-.006*** 
(.0005) 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. For the probit models, the estimates are presented as 
marginal effects and are interpretable as the percentage point impact on the outcome variable of a one 
unit change in the relevant explanatory variable calculated at the sample mean, with spells for those 
with previous NDYP episodes are excluded.  Age, married/cohabit and age group specific quadratics in 
time are included in the selection probit but excluded from the outcome probit. The correlation 
coefficients (p-values) between the selection and outcome probits are .918*** (.013) and .885*** 
(.016) respectively.  
 
Now consider the CPH estimates for the job entry hazard presented in Table 4. Again, 
estimates from five variants of the model are presented, with discussion of models 4 
and 5 left for Section 8. Models 1 and 2 suggest NDYP participation also boosts the 
hazard rate for job entry by around 40%, although participation in Follow Through is 
correlated with a lower job entry hazard. Turning to Model 3, again we see a positive 
and highly statistically significant coefficient on the interactive term in the level of 
 31unemployment and a negative and highly statistically significant coefficient on the 
interactive term in the square of unemployment. As for the unemployment exit 
hazard, the magnitude of this interactive effect is large: combining the coefficients 
from the standalone and interactive NDYP dummies suggests participation in NDYP 
increases the hazard by 44% at the mean unemployment rate but only by 40% at plus 
or minus one standard deviation. Figure 6 plots the estimated participation effect on 
the hazard across unemployment rates ranging from two standard deviations below to 
two standard deviations above the mean, and again shows robustness to inclusion of 
higher order interactive terms.  
 
Figure 6: Sensitivity of NDYP Impact on the Hazard Rate for Job Entry by 
TTWA Unemployment Rate, NDYP Interacting with Different Order 
Unemployment Rate Polynomials, Model 3 
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 32Table 4: Cox PH Estimates, Job Entry, Coefficients (St. Errors)  
 Model  1 
 
Model 2  Model 3 
 
Model 4  Model 5 
NDYP  
 
.453*** 
(.014) 
.398*** 
(.014) 
.188*** 
(.065) 
.184*** 
(.068) 
.497*** 
(.110) 
NDYP* 
Unemp. rate 
   .144*** 
(.035) 
.151*** 
(.035) 
.025 
(.044) 
NDYP* Unemp. rate^2      -.021*** 
(.005) 
-.022*** 
(.005) 
-.011** 
(.005) 
NDYP*age      .033*** 
(.005) 
.035*** 
(005) 
NDYP*cohabit      -.103*** 
(.028) 
-.096*** 
(.028) 
NDYP*managerial      -.135* 
(.076) 
-.139* 
(.076) 
NDYP*professional      -.213*** 
(.075) 
-.223*** 
(.075) 
NDYP*associate  prof      -.128*** 
(.044) 
-.133*** 
(.045) 
NDYP*admin      -.213*** 
(.032) 
-.211*** 
(.033) 
NDYP*skilled  trade      -.143*** 
(.032) 
-.133*** 
(.032) 
NDYP*personal  service      -.157*** 
(.049) 
-.140*** 
(.049) 
NDYP*sales      -.068* 
(.035) 
-.088** 
(.035) 
NDYP*process  ops.      -.055 
(.038) 
-.044 
(.038) 
NDYP*past unemp. 
duration 
    -.0001*** 
(.00003) 
-.0001*** 
(.00003) 
NDYP*UoD dummies 
 
   No  No  Yes*** 
Follow Through 
 
-.223*** 
(.018) 
-.217*** 
(.018) 
-.216*** 
(.018) 
-.217*** 
(.018) 
-216*** 
(.018) 
Unemployment rate  -.097*** 
(.002) 
-.073*** 
(.004) 
-.072*** 
(.004) 
-.072*** 
(.004) 
-.070*** 
(.004) 
Characteristics  controls  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***  Yes*** 
UoD dummies 
 
No Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
Age-group specific time 
quadratics 
No Yes***  Yes***  Yes***  Yes*** 
No. Spells  384646  384646  384646  384646  384646 
No. Failures  177595  177595  177595  177595  177595 
No. Individuals  135736  135736  135736  135736  135736 
Log  pseudo-likelihood -2140712 -2133167 -2133154 -2133103  -2132936 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered at the individual level.  
 
Table 5 shows sensitivity to model/sample variations, with an additional variant that 
reclassifies all exits to unknown destinations as exits to employment. As before, all 
but one of these variants suggest a similar inverse-U shaped relationship between the 
impact of NDYP participation on the hazard for job entry and the unemployment rate.   
 33 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis, Job Entry, Models 3 & 5 
Model 3  Model 5   
NDYP* 
Unemp. rate 
NDYP* Unemp. 
rate^2 
NDYP* 
Unemp. rate 
NDYP* Unemp. 
rate^2 
CPH, as reported in Table 4  .144*** 
(.035) 
-.021*** 
(.005) 
.025 
(.044) 
-.011** 
(.005) 
CPH, NDYP interacted with 
unemployment rate at 6 
months 
.156*** 
(.036) 
-.023*** 
(.005) 
.019 
(.046) 
-.011* 
(.006) 
CPH, excluding those with a 
previous NDYP episode 
.118*** 
(.037) 
-.017*** 
(.005) 
.004 
(.047) 
-.006 
(.006) 
CPH, excluding Pathfinder 
Areas 
.150*** 
(.037) 
-.021*** 
(.005) 
.036 
(.046) 
-.011* 
(.006) 
CPH, NDYP = 1 after 5 
months 
.073** 
(.029) 
-.012*** 
(.004) 
-.031 
(.035) 
-.002 
(.004) 
CPH, spells right censored 
at 10 months 
.106*** 
(.039) 
-.017*** 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.049) 
-.008 
(.006) 
CPH, spells right censored 
at 9 months 
.094** 
(.042) 
-.016*** 
(.006) 
-.008 
(.054) 
-.008 
(.007) 
CPH, spells right censored 
at 8 months 
.067 
(049) 
-.013** 
(.006) 
-.077 
(.063) 
-.002 
(.008) 
CPH, 24 year olds vs. 25 
year olds only 
.313** 
(.146) 
-.043** 
(.019) 
.104
+ 
(.122) 
-.029*
+ 
(.015) 
CPH, exits to employment + 
exits to unknown 
destination 
.154*** 
(.026) 
-.023*** 
(.003) 
.009 
(.031) 
-.013*** 
(.004) 
MPH model, Weibull 
baseline, gamma-distributed 
unobserved heterogeneity 
.180*** 
(.038) 
-.034*** 
(.005) 
.080* 
(.047) 
-.036*** 
(.006) 
NDYP* Unemp. Rate 
polynomials order 1-5 
See Figure 6  See Figure 6 
Probit marginal effects for 
probability of being 
employed after 10 months, 
conditional on being 
unemployed after 6 months 
.018*** 
(.003) 
-.003*** 
(.0004) 
.014*** 
(.003) 
-.003*** 
(.0004) 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. For the probit selection models the correlation 
coefficients (p-values) between the selection and outcome probits are .580*** (.054) and .617*** 
(.056) respectively. 
+ based on sample restricted to those aged between 23.5 and 26.5 years at start of 
spell.  
  
 
Recall in Section 2 that a number of different mechanisms – related to the availability 
and quality of vacancies, to the characteristics of the individual, and to differences in 
the delivery of the programme in different localities – may drive these results. (So far 
we have not controlled for heterogeneous impacts along the latter two dimensions.) 
This is also the case for the Kluve (2006) estimates (no relationship), and for some 
Lechner and Wunsch (2009) estimates (positive relationship). If we drop the squared 
 34interactive term and include only the interactive term in levels, we obtain either no 
relationship (exits from unemployment) or a negative relationship (job entry) between 
programme impact and unemployment rate (see Figures 5 and 6). The implication is 
that differences in specification along linear/non-linear lines are not sufficient to drive 
these contrasting results.    
 
8.  Controlling for Differential Impacts Along Other Dimensions 
 
Here we do control for heterogeneous programme impacts by participant 
characteristics and by differences in provision, more in line with the Lechner and 
Wunsch (2009) study. We do so in two steps: first including covariates interacting the 
NDYP dummy with observed participant characteristics (Model 4); second including 
these interactive covariates alongside covariates interacting the NDYP dummy with 
the set of UoD dummies to capture differences in programme provision (Model 5).  
 
The corresponding hazard rate (for model 5) is given by the following:  
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CPH estimates for Model 4 are presented in Table 2 column four (for exits from 
unemployment) and Table 4 column four (for job entry). In both cases the additional 
interactives are all (or almost all) statistically significant, suggesting that NDYP 
participation has a bigger impact on the unemployment exit/job entry hazard for older 
members of the 18-24 age group compared to younger ones; for singles; for those 
 35seeking unskilled jobs; and for those with less previous experience of unemployment. 
The coefficients on the NDYP*unemployment interactive terms barely change, 
suggesting the inverse-U shape found in both versions of Model 3 is not driven by 
differences in the characteristics of unemployed young people across labour 
markets.
13 Given this robustness it also seems unlikely that the inverse-U shaped 
relationships found in Section 7 were driven by heterogeneous programme impacts 
across unobserved individual characteristics.  
 
The equivalent estimates for Model 5 are presented in Table 2 column five (exits from 
unemployment) and Table 4 column five (job entry). In both cases the interactive 
NDYP*UoD dummies are jointly statistically significant, suggesting either that 
differences in the way NDYP is provided across UoDs lead to substantial variation in 
its impacts, or that the UoD dummies are capturing some other unobserved variation 
across space. We cannot rule out that the NDYP*UoD interactive dummies are partly 
capturing variation in programme impacts with unemployment rates, but because UoD 
geographies differ from TTWA geographies – there are twice as many TTWAs as 
there are UoDs – there is still substantial variation in unemployment rates across 
space within UoDs as well as across time.
14  
 
The inclusion of the NDYP*UoD interactive dummies has a very interesting effect on 
the coefficients on the interactive NDYP*unemployed terms in levels and squares.
15 
In both cases the levels term is much smaller in magnitude and no longer statistically 
                                                 
13 The coefficient on the standalone NDYP dummy now (somewhat artificially) captures the impact of 
NDYP participation for an individual with all covariates set equal to zero.  
14 The standard deviation for unemployment rates across the whole sample is 1.38 compared to an 
average standard deviation in unemployment rates within UoDs of 1.00.  
15 The coefficient on the standalone NDYP dummy now captures the impact of NDYP participation for 
an individual with all covariates set equal to zero and in the omitted UoD (Birmingham). 
 36significant, and the negative coefficient on the squared interactive term halves in 
magnitude but remains statistically significant. So rather than inverse-U shaped 
relationships between programme impacts and unemployment rate we obtain negative 
relationships that, at least around the mean, are quite well approximated by straight 
lines, even when we include higher order interactive terms (see Figures 7 and 8). The 
magnitude of the variation is still large: moving up the unemployment rate 
distribution from the mean by one standard deviation reduces the programme impact 
on the hazard for unemployment exit from 61% to 49% and for job entry from 45% to 
36%.
16 But the suggestion is that some of the variation in programme impacts that we 
previously put down to variation in unemployment rates, particularly at the lower end 
of the unemployment rate distribution, is in fact driven by variation in programme 
provision that is itself correlated with unemployment rates.  
 
Figure 7: Sensitivity of NDYP Impact on the Hazard Rate for Unemployment 
Exit by TTWA Unemployment Rate, NDYP Interacting with Different Order 
Unemployment Rate Polynomials, Model 5 
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16 Remember these are for a particular (rather strange) individual with all covariates set to zero and in 
Birmingham UoD.  
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of NDYP Impact on the Hazard Rate for Job Entry by 
TTWA Unemployment Rate, NDYP Interacting with Different Order 
Unemployment Rate Polynomials, Model 5 
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Columns three and four of Tables 3 and 5 present estimates from variations of the 
sample and model, as described in the previous section, to explore the robustness of 
these results. First consider the unemployment exit hazard: in all versions of the 
hazard model the levels interactive term is statistically insignificant and the squared 
interactive term is significant and negative. In the probit for not being unemployed 
after ten months the levels interactive term is positive and statistically significant at 
the 95% level. So although we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that we still 
have an inverse-U shaped relationship between programme impact and unemployment 
rates, the weight of the evidence points towards something close to a linear negative 
relationship. The estimates for the different versions of the job entry hazard model are 
more mixed, with some variants of the model suggesting no relationship, or only a 
marginally significant relationship, with the squared interactive term.  
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The negative relationship between programme impacts and unemployment rates 
suggests that the dominant mechanism, once heterogeneous impacts by individual 
characteristics and difference in provision are controlled for, is the relative lack of 
vacancies in slack local labour markets. In this respect our results are more in line 
with Bloom et al. (2001) than Lechner and Wunsch (2009). Given the sensitivity of 
the job entry result, however, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that there is 
no relationship between unemployment rates and programme impacts on job entry, 
other things being equal. This is more in line with Kluve (2006) and Lechner and 
Wunsch (2009). If this is the case then our downward sloping relationship between 
programme impact and unemployment exit must be at least partly driven by 
differential impacts of NDYP participation on exits to destinations other than 
employment, e.g. to education and training. We know that such exits, particularly 
through the full time education and training Option, have been a key part of NDYP’s 
overall impact (e.g. Wilkinson, 2003; McVicar and Podivinsky, 2009). Given poorer 
job prospects, are young people in slack labour markets less willing to take this 
Option – longer in duration than the other Options – than those in tight labour 
markets?  
 
9.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper is the first to demonstrate that a large scale British ALMP – the NDYP – 
had heterogeneous impacts systematically related to local labour market conditions. 
The precise nature of this relationship is robust to controlling for heterogeneous 
programme impacts by participant characteristics, but is sensitive to whether 
 39heterogeneous programme impacts due to local differences in NDYP provision, 
themselves correlated with unemployment rates, are controlled for. When such 
differences in provision are not controlled for, the impact of programme participation 
on the unemployment exit and job entry hazards has an inverse-U shaped relationship 
with unemployment rates. Our interpretation is that this reflects the combined effects 
of two underlying mechanisms: first, that there are fewer vacancies with which to 
match programme participants in slack areas; and second, that programme providers 
in tight labour markets are more likely to sanction extending Gateway beyond four 
months, whereas those in slack labour markets are more likely to push participants to 
enter Options within four months (Dorsett, 2006). When such differences in provision 
are controlled for – better isolating the relative lack of vacancies mechanism – the 
impact of programme participation on the unemployment exit and job entry hazards 
has a monotonic, downward sloping relationship with local unemployment rates. In 
short, the NDYP was least effective where it was most needed.  
 
To what extent might these conclusions generalise beyond the NDYP? Clearly the 
theoretical arguments, including questions relating to monotonicity and sensitivity to 
controlling for other dimensions along which programme impacts might vary, are not 
specific to any particular ALMP. Further, despite differences in specification, our 
results are broadly consistent with those from the Bloom et al. (2001) and are not 
entirely inconsistent with those of Kluve (2006). We do not find the same signed 
relationship between programme impacts and unemployment rates as Lechner and 
Wunsch (2009), but the programmes considered are rather different, and we are able 
to exploit variation in unemployment rates over 300 local labour markets as well as 
over time, whereas Lechner and Wunsch (2009) base their positive relationship 
 40between program impacts and unemployment rates only on variation in national rates 
over time (the relationship is insignificant when they use regional rates).  
 
If ALMPs are least effective where and when they are most needed, as suggested here 
for the British NDYP, then policy makers are faced with two (related) problems. First, 
providing similar ALMPs across different local labour markets at a given point in 
time may exacerbate existing spatial differences in unemployment, so ALMPs may 
need to be targeted with this in mind and/or coupled with additional demand side 
measures in high unemployment areas (e.g. Sunley et al., 2005). Second, ALMPs that 
were effective in the relatively tight national labour markets that preceded the global 
financial crisis of 2008 may be less effective now unemployment has risen 
substantially across many OECD countries.  
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